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INTRODUCTION 
Most analyses of the financial crisis of 2007-2008 assign a 
large causal role to inflated credit ratings. Credit rating agency 
reforms enacted under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), 1 as well as earlier 
rule changes implemented by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), address several factors that contributed to 
inflated ratings, but fail to target the ratings flaw implicated 
most directly in the crisis. I propose an additional reform to 
address this flaw. 
The flaw lay in ratings of "second-Ievel"2 mortgage securi-
tizations: individual mortgages were pooled and securities sold 
against them, and some of these "first-level" securities were 
then re-pooled and sold in collateralized debt obligations 
(CnOs). The structure of the cno promises steady returns 
under normal economic conditions, followed by a large loss 
1. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. 
L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
2. See Frank Partnoy, Overdependence on Credit Rating Agencies Was a Pri-
mary Cause of the Crisis 4-7 (Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Research Paper 
Series, Working Paper No. 27, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
soI3/papers.cfm?abstracUd= 1427167## (referring to "first-Ieveln and "sec-
ond-level" securitizations); Press Release, Bank for Int'l Settlements [BIS] 
Joint Forum, Credit Risk Transfer: Developments from 2005 to 2007, at 6 (July 
2008) [hereinafter Credit Risk Transfer], available at http://www.bis.org/ 
publ(joint21.pdf (referring to "one-Iayern and "two-layer" securitizations). 
Imaged with Permission ofN.Y.U. Journal of Law & Business 
2010] enD RATINGS AND SYSTEMIC INSTABIliTY 3 
during a period of system-wide stress. The steady returns, abet-
ted by high credit ratings, can provide an illusion of safety and 
hide the risk of large losses. For this reason, many commenta-
tors believe the sale of enos should be restricted or banned.3 
I argue against banning the construction and sale of 
enos, and instead propose a ceiling on the credit ratings as-
signed to them. This ceiling would severely hamper CDOs' use 
in hiding risk without impeding their use for potentially bene-
ficial purposes. While direct restraints on the rating agencies 
may run up against First Amendment obstacles, the same ob-
jective could be achieved through regulation of the sale of 
CDOs. 
This may appear to be a case of closing the barn door 
when the horse is far afield, as the CDO market has collapsed 
since the crisis. But memories are short in financial markets. I 
would argue that a more apt metaphor is that of patching a 
crack in the dam holding back systemic risk while the river is 
dry. The fact that risk will eventually find its way to other pres-
sure points in the dam is no reason not to fix the crack we see. 
This paper aims first to provide an account of securitiza-
tion, ratings, and their role in the crisis for the lay reader. 
With this background, I propose a eDO rating ceiling and ex-
plain why it is needed despite other rating industry reforms. 
Section I supplies several preliminary definitions. Section II 
provides a brief overview of the structured financial products 
at the heart of the crisis. Section III describes how these prod-
ucts are rated, and the role and function of ratings in financial 
markets. Section IV gives an account of the role these products 
and ratings played in the financial crisis. Section V proposes a 
rating ceiling and briefly critiques other reforms and reform 
proposals in light of their effectiveness at addressing ratings' 
role in the crisis. Section VI proposes an additional reform 
and concludes. 
3. E.g., Nouriel Roubini: Forget Subprime Mortgages. It's the Subprime Finan-
cial System We Need To Fix., TELEGRAPH, May 4, 2010, http://www.telegraph. 
co.uk/finance/financetopics/financia\Crisis/7675641/Nouriel-Rou bini-for-
get-sub-prime-mortgages.-Its-the-sub-prime-financial-system-we-need -to-
fix.html ("securities like CD Os ... must be heavily regulated if not banned . 
. . . [T]hey don't transfer risk so much as mask it under the cover of esoteric 
and ultimately misleading risk-management strategies."). 
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The mortgages at the heart of the crisis were of two types: 
subprime and Alt-A. Subprime applies to borrowers with poor 
credit scores, while Alt-A describes loans with relatively risky 
underwriting features, such as little or no documentation of 
income, and high ratios of loan size to home value. 4 
B. Structured products 
A securitization, or structured financial product,:; refers to 
the aggregation of assets into a "pool," and the issuance of 
bonds funded and collateralized by that pool.6 A eno can re-
fer to the securitization of unstructured products, such as cor-
porate loans and bonds (also referred to as collateralized loan 
obligations or collateralized bond obligations, respectively), or 
to the securitization of structured products. Structured prod-
ucts that might go into the collateral pool of a cno include 
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), which securi-
tize home mortgages; commercial mortgage-backed securities 
(CMBS), which securitize mortgages on commercial proper-
ties; and asset-backed securities (ABS) , which securitize various 
assets such as credit card receivables, student loans, and auto 
loans. 7 CDOs that securitize corporate loans or bonds are, like 
RMBS, CMBS, and ABS, "first-level" securitizations. CDOs 
securitizing structured products are "second-level" - securitiza-
tions of securitizations.8 This paper is concerned with the lat-
ter category, also referred to as ABS eDOs or structured fi-
nance cnos. Unless otherwise specified, I will use eno in this 
paper to refer to structured finance CDOs. 
4. Adam B. Ashcraft & Til Schuermann, Understanding the Securitization 
of Subprime MOTtgage Credit 2 (Wharton Fin. lnsts. Ctr., Working Paper No. 07-
43,2008), availahle at http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/papers.cfm?abstracUd= 
1071189. 
5. I use "securitization" interchangeably with "structured financial prod-
uct" or "structured product" in this paper, although a securitization, unlike a 
structured product, does not necessarily involve a hierarchy of tranches on 
the liability side. See infra Section ILA 
6. This process is described in detail infra Section ILA. 
7. See Credit Risk Transfer, supra note 2, app. at 36. 
8. See Partnoy, supra note 2, at 5-6. 
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Another type of structured finance CDO is the COO-
squared, which securitizes other CDO tranches. While one oc-
casionally sees references to CDO-cubeds, the collateral for 
these exponential cnos was usually a melange of securities 
that had gone through varying numbers of securitization itera-
tions.9 
C. Ratings 
The credit rating industry has traditionally been domi-
nated by three rating firms (the "Big Three"): Moody's, Stan-
dard & Poor's (S&P) , and Fitch.1o They use similar symbolic 
rating scales to assess the default probability (S&P and Fitch) 
or expected losses (Moody's) of debt instruments. The ratings 
may be thought of as ordinal rankings of credit risk, with Aaa 
TABLE 1: MEANING OF CREDIT RATINGS 
Credit Rating Agency 
Credit Quality Moody's S&:P Fitch 
Investment grade 
Highest credit quality Aaa AAA AAA 
High credit quality Aal toAa3 AA+ toAA- AA 
Strong payment capacity Al to A3 A+ to A- A 
Adequate payment capacity Baal to Baa3 BBB+ to BBE- BBB 
Speculative grade 
Possibility of credit risk Bal to Ba3 BB+ to BB- BB 
Significant credit risk Bl to B3 B+ to B- B 
High credit risk Caal to Caa3 GGG+ to GGG- CGG 
Default is likely / imminent Ca CG,G CC,C 
In default C SD,D D 
Source: Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Preliminary Report: Credit Ratings and the 
Financial Crisis 
9. See, e.g., Anna Katherine Barnett-Hart, The Story of the CDO Market 
Meltdown: An Empirical Analysis 29 (March 19, 2009) (unpublished A.B. 
thesis, HaIVard University), available at http://www.hks.haIVard.edu/m-rc 
bgl studentsl dunlop/2009-CDOmeltdown.pdf (showing "average number 
of resecuritizations of ... CDO collateralft for underwriters, "calculated as 
the weighted average number of CDO repackaging iterations in each under-
writer's CDOs," and ranging as high as 4.17 for Citigroup and 4.79 for Mer-
rill Lynch). 
10. See Lawrence White, The Credit Rating Agencies and the Subprime Debacle, 
21 CRlTIG\L REv. 389, 389-91 (2009). 
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(Moody's) or AAA (S&P and Fitch) the highest, and Ca 
(Moody's) or C (S&P and Fitch) the lowest before default. ll 
Table 1 provides the scales used by each agency. 
The rating agencies resist the notion that precise 
probability estimates can be matched to these letter grades,12 
but the growth of structured finance has created the need for 
such precision to infonn the parameter estimates of the COO 
rating models. The Big Three now publish historical default 
rates, or "idealized" default probabilities, for each rating that 
they use in modeling CDOS.13 Ratings agencies have also tradi-
tionally claimed that the meaning of ratings is constant across 
asset classes; one should assume, therefore, that the 
probability of default for a AAA-rated cno tranche is roughly 
the same as for a AAA-rated senior unsecured bond issued by a 
corporation. While the rating agencies now provide separate 
rating definitions for different asset classes and issuer types,14 
this is still the standard to which the agencies aspire.15 Finally, 
it is worth emphasizing here that ratings are meant to convey 
only credit risk, not other kinds of risk (such as market risk, 
interest rate risk, or liquidity risk). 
11. For ease of exposition, I will use the Fitch scale (AAA, AA, A, BBB) 
throughout the paper. 
12. STANDARD & POOR'S, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF STRUCTURED FINANCE 
RATINGS 9 (Aug. 23, 2007) [hereinafter STANDARD & POOR'S, FUNDAMENTALS 
OF STRUCTURED FINANCE RATINGS], availahll! at http://www2.standardand 
poors.com/spf/pdf/fIxedincome/Fundamentals_SF_Ratings.pdf ("To at-
tach precise expected default rates to any rating category is to imbue the 
rating process with a degree of scientifIc accuracy that it could not possibly 
bear, and which has never been claimed for it."). 
13. See John M. Griffin & Dragon Yongjun Tang, Did Subjectivity Playa 
Rnll! in CDO Credit Ratings? 69 (Am. Fin. Assoc. 2010 Atlanta Meetings Paper, 
2009), availahll! at http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/papers.cfm?abstracUd=13 
64933. 
14. See STANDARD & POOR'S, RATING DEFlNmoNS (May 3,2010), http:// 
www.5tandardandpoors.com/ratings/ definitions-and-faqs/ en/ us (follow 
"Ratings Definitions" hyperlink); MOODY'S, RATING SYMBOLS AND DEFINmONS 
Uuly 2010), http://v3.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx? 
docid=PBC_79004. 
15. STANDARD & POOR'S, FUNDAMENTALS OF STRUCTURED FINANCE RAT-
INGS, supra note 12, at 10. 
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II. 
THE PRODUCTS 
A. The products: RMBS and CDOs 
Two types of rated products contributed to the cnSlS 
through their poor performance. The first are RMBS, particu-
larly those collateralized by subprime and Alt-A mortgages. In-
dividual mortgages are pooled together into a special purpose 
vehicle called a real estate mortgage investment conduit 
(REMIC). The vehicle is created solely to hold the mortgages 
and issue bonds to investors, and is "bankruptcy remote" from 
the institution creating it.16 The REMIC issues bonds in 
tranches, with more highly rated tranches having repayment 
priority. The highest-rated tranche of RMBS backed by sub-
prime loans typically constitutes approximately 80 percent of 
the deal structure. I7 As a simplified illustration, if the total out-
standing principal of the mortgages in the collateral pool at 
the moment of launch is $100 million, the principal of the 
AAA-rated RMBS will be $80 million. Investors will pay $80 mil-
lion to buy these bonds, and will accept a relatively low rate of 
interest ("coupon"), as these bonds will not suffer principal 
losses until the principal of all lower tranches is exhausted. In-
vestors in lower-rated tranches receive a higher coupon in re-
turn for a higher risk of default. 
As illustrated in Figure 1, interest paid on the mortgages 
in the collateral pool is used to make RMBS holders' coupon 
payments in a priority "waterfall" each month - first the AAA-
rated bondholders receive their coupon payments in full, then 
the AA-rated bondholders, then the A-rated bondholders, and 
so on. 
Principal payments go exclusively to the senior tranche 
for an extended period (usually three years), after which they, 
too, may be disbursed pro rata, as long as certain threshold 
16. "Bankruptcy remote" means that if the REMIC's sponsor bank files 
for bankruptcy, its general creditors cannot reach the mortgages held by the 
REMIC. Similarly, if the mortgages default, the sponsor bank is under no 
legal obligation to make the RMBS holders whole. 
17. Ashcraft & Schuermann, supra note 4, at 45. 
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FIGURE 1: ILLUSTRATIVE FLOW OF PAYMENTS FOR 
SUBPRIME RMBS 
[Vol. 7:1 
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tests (relating, for example, to delinquencies and defaults) are 
met. IS 
The second product at the heart of the crisis was the 
COO. The structure of the COO is similar to that of the RMBS, 
with several important differences. First, COO collateral, as 
noted above, consists not of mortgages or consumer loans, but 
of other rated securities.19 Second, cnos are much less uni-
form than RMBS. RMBS became largely standardized in the 
years leading up to the crisis; COOs were generally custom-
built, which made independent analysis more challenging.2o 
Finally, many cnos were managed. While RMBS collateral was 
fixed at the moment of its creation, COO collateral could 
often be bought and sold, in accordance with covenanted 
minimums and maximums as to the credit ratings of acquired 
collateral and various metrics of diversification.21 
18. See Gary Gorton, The Subfnime Panic 6-12 (Yale Int'} Ctr. for Fin., 
Working Paper No. 08-25, 2008) [hereinafter Gorton, Subfnime Panic]. avail-
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CDO portfolios consisted primarily of junior tranches of 
ABS and RMBS. The average initial rating of CDO collateral 
from 2005 through 2007 was A.22 In a sample of more than 
3,000 RMBS issued between 2001-2007, the average A-rated 
tranche of a subprime RMBS would begin to take losses when 
collateral principal losses reached roughly ten percent, and be 
completely wiped out when losses approached ftfteen per-
cent.23 In RMBS backed principally by Alt-A mortgages, the A-
rated tranche would typically begin taking losses at around ftve 
percent, and be wiped out at roughly 6.5 percent.24 Figure 2 
illustrates the structure of a Mezzanine CDO backed by sub-
prime mortgages. 
FIGURE 2: CDO BACKED BY MEZZANINE RMBS TRANcHEs 
Mortgages RMBS CDO Balance Sheet 
AAA A5sot. Uabiliti .. Ma_ 
AA 
~ Ilea .......... AM ... ior bonds: 
Equity 
76% g 
AAA A·AAbonds: 14% 
AA 
• ~ BB8 
Equity MC1.zaninc BSB 
MOftI<l3fl g 
bonds: 6% 
.. ;/ Equity tranche: 4% Mo......, g 
Source: Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Preliminary Repart: Credit Ratings and the 
Financial Crisis 
CD Os with collateral rated A or above are called "High 
Grade" ABS CDOs; cnos with collateral primarily rated BBB 
are called "Mezzanine," or "Mezz," ABS CDOS.25 
22. Barnett-Hart, supra note 9, at 24. 
23. Adam A5hcraft et aI., MRS Ratings and the Mortgage Credit Boom tbl. 1 
(European Banking Ctr. Discussion Paper, 2010), availahle at http://papers. 
ssrn.com/soI3/papers.cfm?abstracUd=1615613. 
24. ld. 
25. See generally Gorton, Subprime Panic, supra note 18, at 13. 
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In the period from 2005-2007, the issuance of structured 
finance cnos tripled, and COO portfolios became increas-
ingly concentrated in subprime mortgages.26 As illustrated in 
Table 2, high-grade cnos, on average, had half their portfo-
lios invested in subprime RMBS, a quarter invested in other 
RMBS, and almost one-fifth invested in other cno tranches. 
More than three-quarters of the average Mezz cno portfolio 
was devoted to subprime RMBS, with most of the rest invested 
in other RMBS or CDOS.27 
TABLE 2: TYPICAL COLLATERAL COMPOSITION OF ABS CDOs 
High grade Mezzanine 
ABSCDO ABSCDO 
Subprime RMBS 50 77 
OtherRMBS 25 12 
cno 19 6 
Other 6 5 
Source: Bank for International Settlements, Credit Risk Transfer: Deuelopmentsfrom 2005 
to 2007 
While High-Grade CDOs might seem at first glance a 
"safer" bet than Mezz COOs, it is worth noting that their AAA 
tranches could default after portfolio principal losses ex-
ceeded only six percent; Mezz COO AAA tranches, on the 
other hand, typically required portfolio losses of more than 19 
percent before they were breached.28 ABS CDOs backed at 
least in part by subprime RMBS tranches doubled from $77 
billion in 2005 to $150 billion in 2006, and remained above 
$100 billion in 2007.29 
B. The logic of tranching 
The principle behind the tranche structure of both RMBS 
and cnos is that collateral assets are exceedingly unlikely to 
default all at once and lose 100 percent of their value. By con-
26. Credit Risk Transfer, supra note 2, at 5. 
27.Id. 
28. Id. at 53. 
29. Gorton, Subprime Panic, supra note 18, at 17. 
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centrating losses at the bottom of the tranche structure, "safe" 
bonds can be created from riskier collateral assets. All that is 
needed is that the bonds be imperfectly correlated. Coval, 
Jurek and Stafford (Coval et al.) provide a trenchant illustra-
tion of this process.30 Assume for two mortgages of equal face 
value that each has a 0.9 probability of paying off in full and a 
0.1 probability of defaulting and paying nothing. Assume fur-
ther that the mortgages are pooled and two securities of equal 
face value are issued against the pool, one senior and one jun-
ior. For the junior bond to default, it is enough that either 
mortgage defaults. For the senior bond to default, both mort-
gages must default. In order to determine the default 
probabilities of the bonds, we must estimate the correlation of 
the underlying mortgages. Figure 3 illustrates the process if 
there is no correlation. 
In this case, the probability of default for the senior bond 
will be 0.01,31 and the probability of default for the juni-
orbond will be 0.19.32 
As we increase the number of mortgages in the pool, an 
increasing fraction of the bonds backed by the pool will be 
"safer" - that is, have a lower probability of defaulting - than 
the weighted average probability of default of the collateral. 33 
Figure 4 illustrates this. 
In figure 4 there are three mortgages each with a 0.1 
probability of default; assuming no correlation, two of the 
three resulting bonds backed by the pool have a probability of 
30. Joshua D. Coval et al., The Economics of Structured Finance, 23 J. ECON. 
PERSPS. 3. 6-7 (2009). available at http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/lO. 
1257/jep.23.1.3. 
31. The joint default probability for two mortgages can be found by the 
equation: 
PI and 2 = PI P2 + P'.2 (P,(l-P,)P2 (I-P2»1/2 
where PI is the probability of the first mortgage defaulting, P2 is the 
probability of the second mortgage defaulting, and PI.2 is the correlation 
coefficient for the mortgage defaults. The mathematics of correlation across 
more than two variables is beyond the scope of this paper, though we draw 
on its results below. Here, as there is no correlation, the probability of joint 
default is 0.1 x 0.1 = 0.01. 
32. A simple and intuitive way to compute this is first to calculate the 
likelihood that neither bond defaults (0.9 x 0.9) and then subtract this from 
1 to determine the likelihood that at least one bond defauIL~: 1 - (0.9 x 0.9) = 
0.19. 
33. Coval et aI., supra note 30, at 7. 
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FIGURE 3: TRANCHED MBS WITH No CORRELATION ACROSS 
(Two) UNDERLYING MORTGAGES 
Mortgage 1: 
,. $100 
,. 0.1 probability 




,. 0.1 probability 














default less than 0.1.34 This is the process that led to such large 
percentages of subprime-backed RMBS and mezzanine enos 
being labeled as "safe." 
Problems may arise with this structure, however, when 
mortgage default probabilities are correlated. As the correla-
tion of the underlying collateral performance rises, the risk of 
default for the senior bond rises, as well. In the polar case, 
where there is perfect correlation in collateral performance, 
the default probability for each bond will be the same as for 
each of the assets in the collateral pool. If the mortgages have 
a 0.1 probability of default, each bond, regardless of its 
tranche position, will have a 0.1 probability of default. Tranch-
ing will accomplish nothing in this case, and the senior-most 
bond will be no safer than the junior-most. Section IV.A. below 
discusses the problems posed by correlation further. 
34. As long as defaults are uncorrelated, the likelihood that in a pool of n 
mortgages, there will be defaults less than or equal to a given number k can 
be determined by the cumulative binomial distribution function. The 
formula is: 
, n' 
P(X<k)=l: . ~(l-)"" 
- ;.0 (k!( n-k)!) l' P 
where n is the number of mortgages, k is the number of defaults, and p is the 
probability of default for any given mortgage. 
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FIGURE 4: TRANCHED MBS WITH No CORRELATION ACROSS 
(THREE) UNDERLYING MORTGAGES 
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C. The economics 
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Why do we pool and tranche assets into these securitized 
products in the first place? There are several possible market 
imperfections to which structured finance responds. These in-
clude transaction costs, market segmentation, market incom-
pleteness, and asymmetric information.35 I discuss these each 
in turn here, but caution at the outset that these are not the 
only motivating forces in structured finance. Regulatory arbi-
trage and risk hiding (discussed further in Section IV.A.3) 
were likely at least as important in explaining the explosion in 
securitization leading up to the crisis. 
1. Transaction costs 
Some investors may wish to extend their portfolios to sec-
tors and industries to which, absent structured finance, access 
would be impracticable. Consumer credit and residential 
35. Peter M. DeMarzo, The Pooling and Tranching of Securities: A Model of 
Informed Intermediation, 18 REv. FIN. STUD. 1. 2 (2005); Janet Mitchell. Finan-
cial Intermediation Theory and Implications far the Sources of Value in Structured 
Financial Markets 12 (Nat'l Bank of Belg., Working Paper No. 71, 2005). 
available at http://aei.pitt.edu/5738/01/wp71En.pdf. 
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mortgages are prime examples of this. A mutual or pension 
fund that wanted to invest in residential real estate would not 
be able to buy portions of individual mortgages; the transac-
tion costs would be prohibitive. By pooling mortgages and sell-
ing claims on the pool, structured finance reduces the transac-
tion costs to a point where it becomes practicable for institu-
tions to buy into these sectors. 
2. Market segmentation 
By concentrating losses at the lower end of the tranche 
hierarchy, structured finance creates "safe" debt at the top of 
the tranche hierarchy. This creation of safe debt may serve a 
segment of the market that places a premium on safe debt, 
due to "restrictions imposed by preferences, investment man-
dates, or regulation,"36 as well as the need for collateral for 
derivatives transactions and repurchase ("repo") agreements. 
These uses of AAA-rated bonds are discussed in more detail in 
section IV.b., below. Some commentators argue that there was 
indeed an "insatiable demand" for safe debt in financial mar-
kets.37 The explosive demand for AAA-rated debt could not be 
met by the U.S. Treasury or the dwindling number of AAA-
rated corporations.38 By pooling and tranching, structured fi-
nancial products created a large number of (seemingly) safe 
securities out of riskier collateral, helping to meet this de-
mand. 
3. Market incompleteness 
A market where it is not possible to "bet" on a specific 
contingency is "incomplete." In a classic statement of the con-
cept, Stephen Ross draws the analogy of a "market where indi-
viduals are permitted to purchase a grapefruit only if they also 
buy an orange. If, by a fluke, everyone wishes to consume one 
grapefruit with one orange, this constraint has no force. Oth-
36. Mitchell, supra note 35, at 12. 
37. Ricardo J. Caballero, The "Other" Imbalance and the Financial Crisis 2 
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15636,2010), available 
at http://www.nber.org/papers/w 15636.pdf?new_window=l. 
38. Gary Gorton, Slapped in the Face by the Invisible Hand: Banking and the 
Panic of 2007, 10-13,40 (May 9, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinaf-
ter Gorton, Invisible Hand], available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers. 
cfm?abstracUd=1401882. 
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erwise, opening separate markets would improve efficiency."39 
Ross goes on to describe how options written on "primitive" 
assets help complete· markets. In the context of structured fi-
nance, it is possible that pooling and tranching allow investors 
to gain exposure to particular outcomes that they could not 
otherwise have gotten based on any pre-existing combination 
of assets and options. For example, when certain investors 
wanted to bet that the residential housing market would dete-
riorate, derivatives (in this case, credit default swaps (CDS» 
written on specific tranches of mortgage-backed securities al-
lowed them to target the bets they were making in a way they 
may not have been able to without those "primitive" assets. 
Other strategies, such as selling short the shares of construc-
tion companies, or of banks with large exposures to the resi-
dential mortgage market, would likely have proved imperfect 
substitutes.4o 
4. Information asymmetry 
Issuers often have more information about the quality of 
the collateral of their structured products than investors have. 
This could create a "lemons" problem if a pool of collateral 
were not tranched, but rather a pure pass-through vehicle with 
securities having claims to pro rata shares of the collateral and 
its cash flow. A lemons problem exists where information is 
asymmetric as to the quality of a product and sellers cannot 
credibly communicate high quality to buyers.41 In a stylized 
version of a such a market, there are "good" and "bad" prod-
ucts, and (risk-neutral) buyers will pay only the average value 
of the two types, weighted by the perceived likelihood of get-
ting a good or bad result. So if a (risk-neutral) buyer cannot 
distinguish product quality ex ante but thinks he has an equal 
chance of getting a good product worth $20 or a bad product 
worth $10, he will pay up to $15. This result does not, however, 
represent an equilibrium; it drives out those selling good prod-
ucts, as buyers will not pay what the product is worth. At the 
39. Stephen Ross, Options and Efficiency, 90 QJ. ECON. 75, 75-76 (1976). 
40. For an account of how mortgage market bears bet against tranches of 
mortgage-backed securities, see MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT (2010). 
41. George A. Akerlof, The Market fM "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism, 84 QJ. ECON. 488 (1970). 
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limit, only bad products remain and the market for higher 
quality products collapses. 
With a pass-through pool, the seller's retention of a por-
tion of the interest in the pool would not necessarily forestall a 
lemons market. The good-product/bad-product quandary ap-
plies to any portion of the pool the issuer sells. If the pool has 
100 assets each worth $10, and the issuer can convince some-
one that the average asset value is actually $11, the issuer can 
sell an SO-percent interest in the pool for $880. The issuer is 
$80 better off, the buyer has gotten a bad bargain, and the 
dynamics of the lemons market operate as described above. 
There may also be an "ex ante" and an "ex post" aspect to 
a lemons market in structured finance. The ex ante element 
involves adverse selection - the possibility that the seller will 
fill the pool with bad loans. The ex post element involves 
moral hazard. Moral hazard may be relevant where, for exam-
ple, the seller retains servicing rights for the loans it has sold, 
and loan performance depends in part on active monitoring 
and prompt remedial action in the event of delinquency. 
Where the seller no longer retains an interest in loan perform-
ance, it may not pursue its servicing duties with as much vigor. 
The moral hazard problem is, of course, larger than informa-
tion asymmetry, but could contribute to information asymme-
try if, for example, investors have difficulty judging exactly how 
much of an impact the servicer's performance will have on 
loan performance. 
Tranching can solve the lemons problem. Investors in 
structured products may lack information sufficient to judge 
the credit quality of an entire pool, but have enough informa-
tion to feel confident that defaults and losses will not climb 
above a certain point. (They may also rely on rating agencies 
in developing this sense of confidence, as discussed below.) By 
concentrating risk in junior tranches and either holding these 
tranches or marketing them to a smaller subset of sophisti-
cated investors competent to judge them, structured finance 
arrangers can sell the senior tranches to less sophisticated or 
engaged investors without suffering a lemons discount. This 
dynamic makes tranching essential to the successful marketing 
of most structured financial products. 
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5. CDOs vs. RMBS on the economics 
The above explanations of structured finance apply with 
different force to "first-level" securitizations such as RMBS, 
and "second-level" securitizations such as cnos. While trans-
action costs provide a clear rationale for the pooling involved 
in RMBS, they do not for cnos. It is as easy for an institutional 
investor to invest in an RMBS as a CDO. CDOs do not provide 
access to sectors that it would otheIWise be impracticable for 
investors to access. 
Market segmentation does seem to apply to cnos as 
much as to RMBS, at least with respect to the large demand of 
many institutional investors for "safe," AAA-rated securities. 
The first level of securitization can produce, say, $80 million 
worth of "safe" bonds out of $100 million worth of "risky" as-
sets; the second level of securitization may take $10 million of 
the "risky" junior tranches from the first level and create $8 
million more worth of "safe" debt. It is worth briefly noting 
here that from 2005 through 2007, the creation of risky 
tranches at the first level could not keep up with demand, and 
a number of COOs were built synthetically through the use of 
CDS.42 
To the degree that structured finance helps to complete 
markets, it is possible that COOs could create opportunities 
for bets that would not otherwise exist, just as RMBS do. Infor-
mation asymmetry, on the other hand, is less likely to apply to 
CDOs than to RMBS. This is because cnos are composed of 
rated securities. Ratings are easy to understand and are the 
product of a third-party assessment. nespite the many imper-
fections of ratings and the ratings process, ratings probably 
provide investors with enough information to prevent a lem-
ons market, even without tranching. Valuing the consumer 
loans that constitute first-level securitizations such as RMBS, 
on the other hand, is much more difficult, with myriad poten-
tially relevant hard and soft variables43 and no comprehensive 
third-party assessment of each individual loan (though the 
42. See Credit Risk Transfer, supra note 2, at 5. 
43. See Uday Rajan et al., The Failure of Models That Predict Failure: Distance, 
Incentives and Defaults 5-6 (Chi. Grad. Sch. Bus. Research Paper No. 08-19, 
2010), available at http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/facseminars/event/fin 
ance/documents/fin_04_09_ sem.pdf (describing the importance of "soft" 
variables in predicting defaults). 
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credit bureaus do provide credit scores for the individual bor-
rower). The problem of infonnation asymmetry is therefore 
likely to be more serious at the first level than at the second 
level of securitization. Even for an investor who trusts entirely 
in ratings, some tranching at the first level would likely be nec-
essary to prevent a lemons market. This is because it is virtually 
certain that there will be some losses on a pool of thousands of 
consumer loans or mortgages. Because any shortfall of prom-
ised interest or principal constitutes a default, the credit rating 
on a pure pass-through pool would necessarily be "likely to de-
fault," which would not help solve the lemons problem. There 
must be some buffer for a higher rating to attach, which would 
require, at the very least, an equity tranche whose claimant 
bears the residual risk. 
III. 
THE RATINGS 
Ratings have been central to structured finance, and de-
spite provisions of Dodd-Frank that will diminish or remove 
statutory and regulatory reliance on ratings,44 they will likely 
continue to playa key role in the construction and marketing 
of RMBS and COOs. In this section we briefly consider the 
function of ratings in the market, and then examine the 
mechanics of structured finance ratings. 
A. The Junctions oj ratings 
Ratings are used by regulators and private actors to two 
principal ends: risk management and promoting capital mar-
ket efficiency. 
1. Risk management 
Regulators. Regulators have used ratings for decades to 
prescribe holding and capital requirements for financial insti-
tutions and investment funds. 45 During the years leading up to 
the crisis, these prescriptions were mandated by a raft of statu-
tory and regulatory references to ratings.46 Eligible ratings 
44. See infra note 48 and accompanying text. 
45. See Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two 
ThurrWs Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619. 690-703 
(1999) . 
46. Id. 
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were restricted to those issued by Nationally Registered Statisti-
cal Rating Organizations (NRSROs), as designated by the 
SEC.47 The Dodd-Frank Act, however, provides for the re-
moval of a number of statutory references to the rating agen-
cies and orders federal agencies to remove regulatory refer-
ences over the course of next year.48 It is unclear what risk 
management metrics the federal agencies will use in place of 
ratings, but they may continue to use ratings as part of a mix of 
factors to determine creditworthiness in regulating institu-
tional holdings. Many state insurance regulators continue to 
employ ratings to establish holding and capital requirements 
for insurance companies.49 
Investment funds. Money management institutions usually 
adopt guidelines limiting permissible investments by rating 
classification. According to a 2007 survey of 200 fund manag-
ers and plan sponsors in the United States and Europe, 86 per-
cent of fund managers and 92 percent of plan sponsors explic-
idy rely on ratings in their investment guidelines. 50 Ratings-
based restrictions are assumed voluntarily by fund managers to 
resolve a principal-agent problem inherent in the relationship 
between investor and fund manager. The fund manager takes 
a cut of any investment gains, but, due to limited liability, suf-
fers truncated losses in the event of an investment turned sour. 
Because of this, he or she will often have an incentive to take 
excessive risks from the investors' perspective. The use of rat-
ings-based restrictions limits the risk that fund managers can 
take on, thus easing investor concerns and aiding fund forma-
tion. 
47. The Big Three firms were grandfathered in as NRSROs; for many 
years thereafter it was virtually impossible for other agencies to attain this 
status. This changed with the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, 
which streamlined the NRSRO registration process for new agencies. There 
are currently 10 NRSROs. 
48. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. 
L. No. 111-203 §§ 939-939A, 124 Stat 1376 (20lO). 
49. Partnoy, supra note 45, at 700-OJ. 
50. Richard Cantor et aI., The Use of Credit Ratings in Investment ManagPr 
ment in the U.S. and Eurqpe 9-10 (Working Paper, 2007), available at http:/ / 
ssm.coml abstract=996133. 
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Financial contract counterparties. Private parties to fmandal 
contracts often use ratings to control counterparty risk. 51 
Downgrades may seIVe as triggers for contract termination, in-
terest rate adjustments, collateral adjustments, or other ac-
tions. For example, AIG's contracts with CDS counterparties 
called for AIG to post more collateral upon the downgrade of 
the relevant reference security, and/or upon the downgrade 
of AIG itself.52 When the rating agencies downgraded AIG in 
September 2008, the company calculated it would have to post 
$18 billion in additional collateral to its counterparties, likely 
pushing it into bankruptcy absent government inteIVention, 
all without any actual defaults on the reference instruments 
for its credit default swaps. 53 
2. Capital market efficiency 
In efficient securities markets, a relatively small number 
of arbitrageurs seeking and trading on information can pro-
duce a market price for a security with the character of a pulr 
lic good: it impounds all relevant public information, and un-
sophisticated investors can generally buy and sell on the same 
terms as the savviest traders. This pricing function helps guide 
capital to its most productive uses. To the degree this mecha-
nism holds, it does so primarily in highly liquid secondary mar-
kets.54 
Many debt instruments, however, are traded only thinly or 
not at all in secondary markets. In these cases, rating agencies 
may promote efficient allocation of capital in two respects. 
First, where investors could, with some investigation, satisfy 
themselves as to a bond's credit quality, reliable ratings pre-
vent duplication of effort among investors. They may also 
open the market to investors for whom the cost of investiga-
tion would otherwise outweigh a bond's attractiveness relative 
to other investments. 
51. See MOODY'S, RATING TRIGGERS IN THE AssET MANAGEMENT INDUSTRY 
(2008), http://v3.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?dodd= 
PBe_113877. 
52. Robert O'Harrow Jr. & Brady Dennis, Downgrades and Downfalls, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 2008, at AI. 
53. Carrick Mollenkamp et al., Behind AlG:S- Fall, Risk Models Failed To Pass 
Real-World Test, WAll. ST. j., Oct. 31, 2008, at AI. 
54. Gorton, Invisihk Hand, supra note 38, at 9-10. 
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Second, rating agencies can help issuers avoid lemons 
markets.55 If there are obstacles to issuers communicating 
high credit quality directly to investors, they may seek to com-
municate it through a reputational intermediary. Rating agen-
cies may play this role in structured financial products when 
investors are unable to assess credit quality due to complexity. 
In such a case, the rating agencies may have sophisticated 
models for estimating credit risk on which investors might rely. 
It is therefore worth briefly outlining rating methodologies for 
RMBS and cnos. 
B. Rating mechanics for structured products 
To rate both enos and RMBS, the rating agencies em-
ploy statistical models in order to determine the expected 
losses on collateral pools, and then model the cash flow from 
the pool to the tranched securities issued against the pool,56 
There is, however, a significant difference in the model inputs 
for RMBS as opposed to cnos. RMBS models incorporate a 
large number of variables, such as the loan-to-value ratio of the 
mortgages, credit scores of the borrowers, debt-to-income ra-
tios of the borrowers, loan seasoning, property type, whether 
the mortgage was adjustable- or fixed-rate, and geographic di-
versification. 57 cno models incorporate just a few variables: 
collateral assets' current credit rating, maturity, and asset 
type.58 
Based on their models, the rating agencies run a large 
number of simulations to generate a probability distribution of 
losses on the collateral pool. Three parameter estimates drive 
the simulations: collateral default frequencies, recovery rates, 
and correlations. 59 
The rating agencies have also developed expected default 
rates for each rating category and maturity. Table 3 provides 
the expected defaults for AAA-rated cnos used by each rat-
55. See supra Section II.C.4. 
56. See Credit Risk Transfer, supra note 2, at 56-58. 
57. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, PRELIMINARY STAFF REpORT: CREDIT RAT-
INGS AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 15-16, (2010) [hereinafter CREDIT RATINGS 
AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS], http://www.fcic.gov/reports/pdfs/201O-0602-
Credit-Ratings. pdf. 
58. Credit Risk Transfer, supra note 2, at 57. 
59. CREDIT RATINGS AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, supra note 57, at 19. 
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ings firm, derived from historical data. To illustrate the rating 
process in simple terms, imagine that S&P is analyzing and rat-
ing a five-year CDO. How large a portion of the CDO will re-
ceive a AAA rating? As Table 3 indicates, S&P expects 0.118 
percent of structured finance tranches with AAA ratings and 
five-year maturities to default. This means it expects such se-
curities to perfonn as promised 99.882 percent of the time. 
TABLE 3: RATING AGENCIES' AAA-RATED EXPECTED DEFAULT 
RATES FOR STRUCTURED FINANCE60 
Maturi'1' in Years 
All in percent 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Fitch Criterion 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.15 0.19 
Moody's 
0.0001 0.0002 0.0007 0.0018 0.0029 0.0040 0.0052 0.0066 0.0082 0.0100 Criterion 
S&P Criterion 0.000 0.009 0.030 0.065 0.118 0.190 0.285 0.405 0.552 0.728 
Source: John M. Griffin and Dragon Tang, Did Subjectivity Play a Rok in CDO Credit Ratings? 
S&P will then refer to the probability distribution of losses 
its model simulations have generated to determine the AAA 
tranche size. If, for example, expected losses will exceed $2 
million in a $10 million dollar deal just 0.118 percent of the 
time, then the AAA tranche size of the deal will be $8 million 
($10 million - $2 million). The same process informs the rat-
ings for each tranche. 
IV. 
THE PROBLEM 
A. The problem with CDOs 
1. Increased sensitivity 
Structured finance CDOs were constructed from the 
lower tranches of "first-level" securitizations, with portfolios 
dominated by subprime RMBS.61 For subprime RMBS, the 
principal of the BBB-rated tranches would typically begin tak-
ing losses when pool losses exceeded roughly six percent, and 
would be completely wiped out when pool losses reached ap-
60. Fitch and Moody's refer to these figures as "idealized default 
probabilities," while S&P refers to them as the expected default rates, but 
they serve the same function. Griffin & Tang, supra note 13, at 69 tbi. AI. 
61. Credit Risk Transfer, supra note 2, at 5. 
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proximately 9.5 percent.62 BBB-rated RMBS tranches backed 
by Alt-A mortgages would typically take losses when the collat-
eral pool losses reached roughly four percent, and would be 
wiped out at around five percent.63 
The rating agency models that assigned AAA ratings to 
such large portions of ABS CDOs assumed that defaults were 
not highly correlated across the mezzanine RMBS tranches 
that ultimately backed the CDOs.64 The problem with this as-
sumption is that the probability of default and default correla-
tions on consumer loans can rise sharply with macroeconomic 
shocks. Raghuram Rajan, describing building risks in the fi-
nancial system several years before the crisis, obselV'ed that 
"correlations that are zero or negative in normal times can 
turn overnight to one" and that as a result "[a] hedged posi-
tion can become unhedged at the worst times, inflicting sub-
stantial losses on those who mistakenly believe they are pro-
tected."65 As applied to CDOs, low levels of default correlation 
for underlying collateral securities protect the senior tranches 
in normal times. As default correlations rise in a recession, 
however, the senior tranches become vulnerable. What mat-
ters for these senior tranches is not the "average comovement" 
of assets, but the "worst-case comovement."fifi As Coval et al. 
explain, "the securitization process ... substitutes risks that are 
largely diversifiable for risks that are highly systematic. [Such 
securities] have far less chance of surviving a severe economic 
downturn than traditional corporate securities of equal rat-
ing."67 
With respect to mortgages and consumer debt - the foun-
dation of structured finance - job losses and falling asset 
prices can lead to systematically higher levels of default. De-
pending on the severity of the downturn, the systematically 
62. Ashcraft et aI., supra note 23, at tbl. 1. 
63. Id. 
64. Note that any RMBS tranche below AAA is considered mezzanine; 
the fact that CD Os built primarily from AA and A mezzanine tranches were 
called "high grade" reflecL<; a degree of marketing. 
65. Raghuram Raj an , Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier? 
338 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. Wll728, 2005), 
available at http://www.kansascityfed.org/Publicat/sympos/2005/PDF /Ra 
jan2005.pdf. 
66. Cudit Risk Transfer, supra note 2, at 17-18. 
67. Coval et aI., supra note 30, at 4. 
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higher default levels may have a small or even no impact on 
senior tranches of first-level securitizations such as RMBS, 
since senior tranches draw cash flow from the entire collateral 
pool in priority to the lower tranches. This protection of the 
senior tranches comes at the expense of the junior tranches, 
potentially using up the bulk of the cash flow from non-de-
faulting mortgages. Consequently, a severe downturn will have 
a disproportionately large impact on mezzanine tranches of 
RMBS. Because CDOs are built from these mezzanine 
tranches, a rise in defaults that does not affect AAA-rated 
RMBS tranches could completely wipe out an entire CDO 
pool, including the AAA-rated tranches. 
Robert Pozen provides a stylized illustration of this dy-
namic in his book Too Big To Save?68 Imagine 100 bonds of a 
dollar each are issued against a pool of 100 mortgages, and 
that each mortgage pays a dollar 95 percent of the time and 
nothing five percent of the time. Assume their performance is 
not correlated. The bonds are tranched and numbered so that 
smaller numbers are at the bottom of the tranche hierarchy. 
Thus, tranche 1, the riskiest tranche, defaults if any mortgage 
defaults, and tranche 100, the safest tranche, defaults only if 
every single mortgage defaults. Now assume there are 100 
identical RMBS, and tranche 10 from each is pooled into a 
CDO, with an identical structure to the RMBS. Figure 5 illus-
trates this structure. 
In this hierarchy, tranche 10 of each RMBS defaults 2.82 
percent of the time (lower than that of any individual mort-
gage) .69 Assuming no correlation among tranche perform-
ances across RMBS, Tranche 10 of the CDO, in tum, has a 
default probability of 0.05 percent. 
Imagine now that there is a slight downturn that causes 
the default rate of underlying mortgages to rise from 5 per-
cent to 6 percent. Because the downturn is widespread, this 
increase is correlated across all the RMBS, so that each pool 
has expected losses of 6 percent. As shown in Table 4, the 
probability of default will rise from 2.82 percent to 7.75 per-
cent for each RMBS tranche 10, but will increase from 0.05 
68. ROBERT rOZEN, Too BIG To SAVE? 95-96 (2010). The example is 
based on a presentation given by Coval et aI. 
69. This can be computed by the cumulative binomial distribution func-
tion. See supra note 34. 
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percent to 24.71 percent for the CDO tranche 10. If the down-
turn is a bit worse, and mortgage default rates jump to 7 per-
cent everywhere, the default probability will rise to 16.2 per-
cent for the RMBS tranche 10 and to 97.19 percent for the 
CDO tranche 10. 
TABLE 4: SENSITIVITY OF RMBS AND CDO CHANGES IN 
UNDERLYING DEFAULT PROBABILITIES 
Probability of default across all 5% 6% 7% 
underlying mortgages: (baseline 
scenario) 
Probability of default for tranche 2.82% 7.75% 16.2% 
10 of the RMBS: 
Probability of default for tranche 0.05% 24.71% 97.19% 
10 of the CDO: 
I 
Small baseline errors in the estimation of default risk and 
correlation can thus have an outsize impact on the second 
level of securitization. As Coval et al. argue, high ratings for 
second-level securities were justified only "if the rating agen-
cies were extraordinarily confident about their ability to esti-
mate the underlying securities' default risks, and how likely de-
faults were to be correlated."70 
70. Coval et aI., supra note 30, at 3. 
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We should expect, then, that as the housing market dete-
riorated, senior tranches of CDOs backed by mezzanine RMBS 
tranches would wind up performing significantly worse than 
the senior tranches of RMBS themselves. 
2. Actual performance 
Mortgage-backed CDOs did, in fact, perform worse than 
RMBS during the crisis. While many RMBS tranches were 
downgraded, relatively few of the most highly rated tranches 
have suffered impairment.71 For example, by the end of 2008, 
among the 200frvintage RMBS backed by subprime first-lien 
mortgages, only 0.1 percent of Moody's AAA-rated tranches 
had been impaired (by volume), whereas 40.1 percent of AA-
rated tranches, 82 percent of A-rated tranches, and 97 percent 
of BBB-rated tranches had suffered impairment.72 Similarly, 
among 200frvintage Alt-A RMBS, 0.0 percent of AAA-rated 
tranches had been impaired by year-end 2008 (by volume), 
while 13.4 percent of AA-rated tranches, 60.1 percent of A-
rated tranches, and 83.3 percent of BBB-rated tranches had 
suffered impairment.73 
In contrast, 100 percent of Moody's AAA-rated high-grade 
ABS CDOs issued in 2006 had suffered impairment by the end 
of 2008, as had more than half of the 2006-vintage AAA-rated 
71. Impairment can refer to a shortfall in interest or in principal, de-
fined as a rating of Ca (in or very near default) or C (in default with little 
prospect for recovery of principal or interest). See JULIA TUNG, MOODY'S, DE-
FAULT & Loss RATES OF STRUCJ1JRED FINANCE SECURITIES: 1993-2008, 3 
(2009) [hereinafter MOODY'S, DEFAULT & Loss RATES 1993-2008]. Impair-
ment is a surer gauge of credit performance than rating downgrades, given 
that "the accuracy of credit ratings is highly questionable and downgrades 
may not translate into actual losses." Barnett-Hart, supra note 9, at 35. 
72. MOODY'S, DEFAULT & Loss RATES 1993-2008, supra note 71, at 12 ex. 
16. As noted above, Moody's notation differs slightly: Aaa is equivalent to 
AAA, and Baa is equivalent to BBB. For 2005-2007 vintage RMBS (not disag-
gregated by individual year), Moody's has reported the following impair-
ment rates, as a percentage of the dollar-volume of issuances, as of year-end 
2009. For RMBS backed by Alt-A mortgages, 9.9 percent of AAA, 83.3 per-
cent of AA, 92.4 percent of A, and 96.5 percent of BBB tranches have been 
impaired. For RMBS backed by subprime first-lien mortgages, 4.4 percent of 
AAA, 52.1 percent of AA, 75.9 percent of A, and 95.5 percent of BBB 
tranches have been impaired. JULIA TUNG, MOODYS, DEFAULT & Loss RATES 
OF STRUCJ1JRED FINANCE SECURITIES: 1993-2009, 13 (2010) [hereinafter 
MOODY'S, DEFAULT & Loss RATES 1993-2009]. 
73. MOODY'S, DEFAULT & Loss RATES 1993-2009, supra note 72, at 13. 
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mezz ABS CDOs. This latter figure topped 90 percent by the 
end of the first quarter of 2009. 74 (The reason the impairment 
rate of high-grade CDO senior bonds was higher than for mezz 
CDO senior bonds is that the AAA-rated tranches of high-
grade CDOs typically constituted more than 90 percent of the 
securitization, whereas the AAA-rated tranches of mezz CDOs 
typically made up 75-80 percent of the deal value.75) 
This is consistent with the expectations outlined above. As 
mortgage defaults rose, principal impairments climbed a little 
bit up the tranche ladder of RMBS, and very high up the 
tranche ladder of most CDOs. 
3. Regulatory arbitrage and hidden risk-taking 
I argued earlier that of the market imperfections that 
structured finance might address, market segmentation and 
market incompleteness provided possible rationales for CDOs. 
But there was another likely motivation to the construction of 
CDOs: regulatory arbitrage. Some commentators believe that 
the principal use to which structured products were put in the 
years leading up to the crisis was to allow regulated institutions 
to assume more risk than they would otherwise be allowed to 
take.76 There was, first, skepticism that rating agencies could 
accurately capture the risk in RMBS mortgage pools when as-
signing ratings. 77 The more common criticisms arise, however, 
at the CDO level. Critics have, for example, homed in on the 
well-documented lag in rating migrations and the reliance on 
RMBS ratings in setting default probabilities when modeling 
CDOS.78 In other words, an RMBS tranche might carry a rating 
of BBB for an extended period after it becomes clear that its 
credit quality has deteriorated to 'Junk." A CDO may be able 
to buy such a bond at a discount, but use the BBB default as-
sumptions when creating and obtaining ratings for its own 
AAA tranche. This means that the AAA tranche will be rated 
based not only without due regard to the risk of correlated 
74. CREDIT RATINGS AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, supra note 57, at 32, 47. 
75. See Credit Risk Transfer, supra note 2, at 53. 
76. See, e.g., Pannoy, supra note 2, at 11-12; Roubini, supra note 3. 
77. See Joseph R. Mason & Joshua Rosner, Where Did the Risk Go? How 
MisajJjJlied Bond Rntings Cause Mortgage Backed Securities and Collateralized Debt 
Obligation Market Disruptions 3 (Working Paper May 14, 2007), available at 
http://ssm.com/abstract=1027475. 
78. See Partnoy, supra note 2, at 4, 8-9. 
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default, but also with unrealistic assumptions about individual 
RMBS tranches that comprise the CDO. Such CDOs have a 
high level of risk but a "super safe" imprimatur from rating 
agencies. Because these bonds generally offered a premium 
over other AAA-rated bonds,79 they were attractive to regu-
lated fund managers who wanted to increase their yield, and 
were happy to increase their risk levels to do so, without run-
ning afoul of contractual requirements or regulatory restric-
tions. Their risk level complied with the letter but not the 
spirit of these restrictions. 
This explanation of hidden risk relies on malfeasance or 
incompetence by the rating agencies and other market actors. 
There is, however, a more fundamental type of hidden risk 
that CD Os facilitated: "tail risk." This refers to the distribution 
of likely outcomes for senior CDO tranches: perfect perform-
ance under most macroeconomic scenarios, and large losses in 
a crisis (the "tail" of the distribution). Coval et al. describe 
CDOs as economic catastrophe bonds for this reason. so As 
Rajan explains in relation to CDS, these sorts of "tail risks . . . 
produce a positive return most of the time as compensation 
for a rare very negative return. "S1 Because these sorts of invest-
ments display low volatility over extended periods, a portfolio 
of them can appear to "produc[e] very high alphas (high re-
turns for low risk), so managers have an incentive to load up 
on them. Every once in a while, however, they will blow up. 
Since true performance can only be estimated over a longer 
period, far exceeding the horizon set by the average man-
ager's incentives, managers will take these risks if they can."S2 
High CDO ratings facilitated this risk-taking. 
While implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act will likely 
remove many of the incentives for regulatory arbitrage by re-
ducing or eliminating regulatory reliance on ratings, the po-
tential for the risk-hiding use of ratings will persist as long as 
ratings are used by investment funds as a contractual mecha-
79. See MOODY'S, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PAR COUPON SPREADS AND 
CREDIT RATINGS IN US STRUcruRED FINANCE 1 (2005). 
80. Coval et aI., Economic Catastrophe Bonds, 99 AMER. ECON. REv. 628, 628 
(2009), available at http://pubs.aeaweb.org/ doi/pdfplus/1 0.1257 /aer.99.3. 
628. 
81. Rajan, supra note 65, at 20. 
82. Id. 
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nism to restrict excessive risk-taking, and as long as they are 
used as a benchmark for comparing fund performance. 
B. The crisis 
The most obvious contribution of CDOs to the crisis was 
that they contributed an outsize percentage of losses to key 
financial institutions. One empirical study showed that the 
best predictor of bank write-downs during the crisis was "the 
amount of CDOs they issued in 2007, for very few of these 
CDOs would ever leave the balance sheets of their creators."83 
Financial institution losses, however, wound up being 
many times larger than actual default losses, leading to 
bailouts, emergency sales, and bankruptcy. The most cogent 
explanation of how this occurred views the crux of the crisis as 
a type of bank run.84 
1. The run 
The financial crisis was structurally similar to a classic 
bank run, but in the "shadow" banking system rather than the 
traditional banking system.85 A run involves an unexpected de-
mand for redemption of a bank's liabilities. Because these lia-
bilities tend to be short-term (e.g., demand deposit accounts), 
banks are obliged to comply with these demands. The bank's 
assets, however, tend to involve long-term commitments (e.g., 
mortgages); the bank cannot call in these loans in order to pay 
off its depositors. A bank's assets might exceed its liabilities at 
the beginning of a run, but if it is forced to sell long-term as-
sets into illiquid markets, where prices reflect not fundamen-
tals but banks' desperate need for cash ("fire sales"), a run 
could cause major losses and even push the bank into insol-
vency. 
83. Barnett-Hart, supra note 9, at 96. 
84. See generally Gorton, Invisible Hand, supra note 38. This explanation of 
the crisis draws heavily on Gorton's account. 
85. The "shadow" banking system loosely refers to financing functions 
that were removed from the regulatory framework and restrictions of com-
mercial banking over the past decades. 
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The problem of commercial bank runs was largely solved 
with the introduction of deposit insurance in 1934.86 Firms or 
funds with large short-term cash surpluses, however, cannot 
rely on deposit insurance, as their surplus is usually orders of 
magnitude larger than the FDIC's individual account insur-
ance cap.87 Instead, they regularly "deposit" their money with 
another financial institution, and receive collateral in return, 
in a repurchase, or "repo," agreement.88 These agreements 
were an efficient way for financial institutions on the other 
side of the transaction to fund their short-term cash needs. 
Repo agreements are generally for a single night, but may be 
rolled over indefinitely by the parties. In this respect they func-
tion very much like demand deposits - the depositor can with-
draw its money at any point. The repo market had grown im-
mense prior to the crisis - it is estimated to have been as large 
$12 trillion, roughly the same size as the commercial banking 
system.89 
The key to the repo market was the perception of collat-
eral as "safe."90 There was thus a huge demand for "safe" col-
lateral to facilitate this market - a demand that could not be 
met by government bonds or by the shrinking ranks of AAA-
rated industrial firms.91 As indicated above, this demand was a 
primary driver of the structured finance market, and particu-
larly the creation of AAA-rated "second-level" bonds from 
lower-rated bonds. 
In the repo market, a "depositor" (say, a money-market 
mutual fund) wanted to "deposit" its excess cash in a risk-free 
86. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., A BRIEF HISTORY OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE 
IN THE UNITED STATES 25-28,(1998), http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historicaIl 
brief/brhist.pdf. 
87. The cap was $100,000 leading up to the crisis, and has since been 
raised to $250,000. See Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Basic FDIC Ins. 
Coverage Permanently Increased to $250,000 Per Depositor Guly 21, 2010), 
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2010/prl0161.html. 
88. Gorton, Invisible Hand, supra note 38, at 4. 
89. Gary Gorton, Questions and Answers About the Financial Crisis 10 (Nat'l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15787, 2010) [hereinafter 
Gorton, Questions and Answers) (prepared for the Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Commission), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/papers.cfm?abstracc 
id=1557279. 
90. Gorton refers to such debt as "informationally insensitive." Gorton, 
Invisible Hand, supra note 38, at 4. 
91. See Caballero, supra note 37, at 14-15. 
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vehicle. It did not want to worry about the solvency of the 
"bank" (say, Bear Steams) or the value of collateral the bank 
was providing. In trusting the value of the collateral, deposi-
tors relied not on federal insurance, but on rating agencies' 
assurance. Sophisticated investors may have been skeptical 
about the precision of ratings as one moved down the rating 
scale, and indeed AAA ratings did not demand uniform inter-
est rates,92 but there appears to have been a widely accepted 
belief in financial _ markets that the AAA rating equaled 
safety.93 
When it became clear that housing prices were going to 
fall, the market lost faith in ratings on mortgage-backed securi-
ties.94 Further, market actors knew it was unlikely that credit 
rating migrations incorporating this new information would 
be timely, and it started to become clear that AAA-rated CDO 
tranches might actually default in the near term. 
As the market lost faith in the AAA ratings of mortgage-
backed securities and CDOs, the repo market came under in-
creasing strain. Depositors either refused to roll over their 
funds, meaning they withdrew their "deposits," or they de-
manded a higher "haircut" on the collateral, meaning more 
bonds per dollar of "deposit."95 The average haircut on struc-
tured finance products jumped from zero in mid-2007 to 
roughly 10 percent by the end of 2007, and close to 50 percent 
by the end of 2008.96 This amounted to a massive withdrawal 
92. This was due to a number of factors. First, a single CDO often con-
tained two (or more) AAA tranches, one junior and one senior, so that the 
riskier, junior tranche would receive a higher coupon. Second, there were 
many types of risk other than credit risk that inform a security's price. See 
STANDARD & POOR'S, FUNDAMENTALS OF STRUCTURED FINANCE RATINGS, supra 
note 12, at 6. Finally, to the degree that rating agencies were too generous 
giving AAA ratings to eDOs and the market realized it, investors may have 
demanded a slight risk premium. These factors may appear to be in tension 
with the view that AAA ratings equaled safety, but it is possible that there was 
a sense that securities had to be "safe enough" rather than uniformly safe to 
be used as collateral, and the AAA rating was a powerful mnemonic thresh-
old for a security's qualifying "safe enough." 
93. See Credit Risk Transfer, supra note 2, at 13-14. 
94. See Gorton, Subprime Panic, supra note 18, at 20-26. 
95. The "haircut" refers to the percentage difference between the face 
value of the collateral and the loan size in a repo agreement. 1£ the face 
value of the collateral is $100, and the loan is $95, the haircut is 5 percent. 
96. Gorton, Invisibk Hand, supra note 38, at 33. 
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from the repo system, as assets that once collateralized, say, 
$100 million in short-term funding for a shadow bank now 
supported only a fraction of that amount. Liquid assets were 
drained from the institutions that played the role of the bank. 
It was the functional equivalent of a bank run. 
Financial institutions were forced to sell assets to meet 
repo "withdrawals." Many observers believe that because most 
prospective buyers were in the same position, market prices 
collapsed, and securities were sold at fire-sale prices.97 Because 
of mark-to-market accounting rules, this in turn depressed the 
value of other balance sheet assets, which for regulated finan-
cial institutions reduced capital ratios below regulatory re-
quirements and forced further sales, creating a vicious cycle of 
value destruction. 
2. The role of structured products 
The market lost faith in structured product ratings for two 
reasons: first, it became clear that the subprime collateral was 
not worth as much as the face value of the RMBS and enos, 
and, second, there was profound opacity about where the 
losses were located.98 
enos are more blameworthy than RMBS on both counts. 
As explained above, AAA-rated tranches of RMBS - the 
tranches most relevant as collateral - have suffered relatively 
few impairments relative to AAA-rated tranches of enos 
(though they have been downgraded and suffered mark-to-
market losses). Second, enos were more opaque to the mar-
ket. Unlike RMBS, which were largely standardized, enos 
tended to be custom-built. Each had to be modeled sepa-
rately.99 Further, while some RMBS were publicly offered, 
enos were exclusively privately placed, and it was harder to 
get reliable information on them. lOO 
enos were further culpable because without them, it is 
unlikely that the RMBS market would have grown to the ex-
tent it did, which arguably encouraged mortgage originators 
97. See, e.g., Gorton, Subprime Panic, supra note 18. 
98. See id. at 26-27. 
99. Id. at 14. 
100. See Richard Tomlinson & David Evans, TJw &lings Charade, BLOOM-
BERG MARKETS, July 2007, at 53, availohle at http://www.streetfortreasurer. 
com/articles/Ol-072007-Toxic-Debt.pdf. 
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to push into riskier customer markets, sometimes taking steps 
to mask the risk. Without COOs to buy up the lower-rated 
tranches of subprime RMBS, it is likely that many RMBS deals 
would never have successfully gone through. Wi 
As a final note on COOs' role in increasing systemic risk, a 
huge part of the problem going into the crisis was insufficient 
capitalization at banks.lo2 The effects of the shadow bank run 
described above were more severe because banks were so 
thinly capitalized. Many banks used the securitization process, 
and COOs specifically, to lower their capital ratio while meet-
ing regulatory requirements. 109 They could do this by repack-
aging lower-rated securities into COOs or COO-squareds and 
holding them. Because banks were required to hold less capi-
tal against AAA-rated securities than other assets, and because 
the majority of each repackaged COO was rated AAA, the total 
amount of bank capital required to support the identical un-
derlying assets was less than before. 104 
While the crisis had a variety of interrelated causes, the 
role of COOs and COO ratings was significant. 
V. 
PROPOSED REFORM 
A. Ratings ceiling 
1. The proposal 
I have attempted to explain how structured finance CD Os 
are vulnerable to large systemic shocks, wherein the "worst-
case" co-movement of underlying assets can wipe out the lower 
tranches of first-level securitizations, and thus the entire struc-
ture of second-level securitizations. This vulnerability to sys-
temic risk, abetted by high ratings, was a key causal factor in 
the crisis. 
The market has taken care of this problem for the time 
being, as structured finance CDO issuance has collapsed since 
101. See Mason & Rosner, supra note 77, at 69-72 (describing the reliance 
of RMBS markets on eDOs for the sale of mezzanine tranches). 
102. Arnold Kling, Not What They Had in Mind: A History of Policies That 
Produced the Financial Crisis of 2008 6 (Mercatus Fin. Mkts. Working Grp., 
Working Paper No. 1474430, 2009), availahk at http://papers.ssm.com/ 
5013/ papers.cfm?abstracUd=14 74430. 
103. See id. at 68. 
104. See id. 
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the crisiS.105 We cannot, however, rely on the market to self-
regulate during the next period of market euphoria. In bubble 
conditions, not just issuers but investors push against the con-
servatism of gatekeepers such as rating agencies.106 
Many commentators question whether the benefits of 
CDOs outweigh the costs.107 A possible implication of this is 
that CDOs should be banned. lOB I believe that another ap-
proach may salvage any net-positive economic function CDOs 
may serve, while at the same time removing or severely limit-
ing market actors' ability to employ CD Os to hide risk during 
periods of economic growth. This approach would place strict 
limits on the rating of any individual tranche of a CDO. It 
would apply to any re-securitization; in other words, to any 
structured product that has as collateral other structured prod-
ucts (mortgage-backed or asset-backed securities, or other 
CDOs), or derivatives referencing those products (such as 
CDSs). It would still be possible to tranche second-level securi-
105. See SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. AsS'N (SIFMA), GLOBAL CDO ISSUANCE, 
http://www.sifma.org/research/research.aspx?ID=10806 (follow "Global 
CDO Issuance" hyperlink). 
106. See, e.g., JOHN COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS 56 (2006) (explaining with 
respect to the role of accounting firms that "[i]n a bubble, investors lose 
their skepticism .... In this atmosphere of market euphoria, gatekeepers 
become irrelevant - or, even worse, share holden; reinforce the pressure on 
them for the use of risky and/or improper accounting policies in order to 
sustain hyperbolic earnings growth."). 
107. See, e.g., Robert E. Litan, In Defense of Much, but Not All, Financial Inno-
vation 35 (Brookings Inst., Working Paper, 2010), available at http://www. 
brookings.edul - /media/Filesl rei opinions/20 1 0/0217 _financiaUnnova 
tion_litan/0217 _financiaUnnovation_litan.pdf (stating that "it is difficult to 
imagine a more destructive financial innovation" than the CDO); Alan Mur-
ray, Paul Volcl~er: Think More Broadly, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2009, at R.7, 
available at http://online.wsj.com/ artide/NA_ WSJ]UB:SB10001424052748 
704825504574586330960597134.html ("[TJhe economy was rising very 
nicely in the 1950s and 1960s without all of these innovations. Indeed, it was 
quite good in the 1980s without credit-default swaps and without securitiza-
tion and without CDOs. I do not know if something happened that suddenly 
made these innovations essential for growth. In fact, we had greater speed of 
growth and particulady did not put the whole economy at risk of collapse."). 
108. JEROME S. FONs, FONS RISK SOLUTIONS, WHITE PAPER ON RATING COM-
PETITION AND STRUCTURED FINANCE 12 (2008), available at http://www.fons 
l;sksolutions.com/Documents/Ratings%20White%20Paper.pdf ("Even if 
market forces do not render them extinct going forward, the rating of com-
plex structures should be avoided or prohibited."); Roubini, supra note 3. 
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tizations, but ratings would no longer help hide the vulnerabil-
ity of senior COO tranches to systemic shocks. 
There are several approaches one could take to imple-
menting these limits, including an outright ban on the highest 
rating categories for COOs - forbidding, for example, any 
COO tranche, however senior, to receive a rating of AAA and 
AA. Another approach would be to limit COO ratings to the 
weighted average rating of the underlying collateral. In this 
case, the prudent course would be for the weighted average 
rating of the entire pool of assets to set the ceiling for the se-
nior-most tranche of the COO. Any approach that would allow 
the rating of the senior tranche to be greater than the 
weighted average of the entire underlying pool could invite 
arbitrage and risk-hiding during the next period of market eu-
phoria. 
A potential complication for this approach is that default 
probabilities do not climb linearly as one descends the rating 
scale. Table 5 illustrates this with historical default rates for 
Fitch. As one drops from AAA to AA+ (a one-notch drop), the 
annualized default rate climbs 0.04 percentage points, from 
0.02 percent to 0.06 percent. As one falls from CCC to CC (an-
other one-notch drop), however, the annualized default rate 
climbs more than eight percentage points, from 6.64 percent 
to 14.70 percent. The weighting should, therefore, be based 
on expected default probabilities, and not on linear numerical 
weighting of ratings notches. 
Rating agencies already provide expected default 
probabilities for each rating, and Dodd-Frank ensures that this 
will continue by requiring them to do SO.109 
To illustrate the difference between the two approaches 
to calculating the weighted average rating, consider how we 
would compute this rating for a pool of two one-year bonds 
with equal face value: one a AAA bond with a default 
probability of 0.02 percent, and one a BB- bond with a default 
probability of 2.04 percent. If we counted the rating notches 
between the two and picked the rating mid-way between them, 
the result would A- (which otherwise would have a one-year 
default probability of 0.25 percent). If, on the other hand, we 
109. 15 U.S.C. § 780-7 (s)(3) (B) (ii) (II) (West 2006); Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. ] 11-203 
§ 932(a)(8), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
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TABLE 5: HISTORICAL DEFAULT EXPERIENCE OF BONDS 
RATED BY FITCH 
~BmuI.t. 
RDtingal 
isstunaa AM AA+ AA AA- A+ A A- BBB+ BBB 
l().ymr dc:fiwlt 
probability 0.19% 0.57% 0.89% 1.15% \.65% 1.85% 2.44% 3.13% 3.74% 
Default rate 
(annualized ) 0.0'2% 0.06% 0.09% 0.12% 0.17% 0.19% 0.25% 0.32% O.gs% 
~&ruJ.s 
Raling oJ 
issutrnIz BB+ BB BB- B+ B B- ax:+ ax: CC 
l().ymr dc:fiwlt 
probability 10.18% 13.53% 18.46% 22.84% Zl.67% 34.98% 43.36% 48.52% 77.00% 
Ddiwlt """ 
(annualized) \.07% \.45% 2,04% 2.59% 3.24% 4.30% 5.68% 6.64% 14.70% 







computed the average of the two default probabilities, we 
would get 1.03 percent; we could then find the rating whose 
default probability most closely matched this, rounding up (as 
rounding down could invite further arbitrage). In this case, 
that would be BB+, with a one-year expected default 
probability of 1.07 percent. 
Another approach would weigh average expected loss 
rates rather than default probabilities. This may be preferable 
to the degree we expect a large variance in the amount of 
losses given default. 
Finally, it would be possible to limit the size of any 
tranche with a given rating to the value of the underlying col-
lateral with an identical rating. Thus, if AAA-rated bonds made 
up five percent of the value of the collateral of a CDO, the 
CDO could issue a AAA-rated tranche not exceeding five per-
cent of the deal value. 
These are admittedly blunt tools, but they have the advan-
tage of providing clear guidelines that would be relatively resis-
tant to a slippage in standards during the next bubble. Most 
importantly, they would prevent the creation of second-level 
securitizations aimed at creating apparently "safe" debt out of 
riskier debt. They would force raters to treat the worst-case co-
movement of junior first-level bonds as what matters. The wis-
dom of restricting ratings in such a manner, of course, rests on 
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a judgment that the range of beneficial uses of CDOs is likely 
very narrow. 
2. Potential concerns 
What do we give up with a CDO rating ceiling? 
What might be lost with this approach? Here we may 
hearken back to the market failures to which, I argue, CD Os 
may respond. First, there is the creation of "safe" AAA-rated 
debt to serve a market that places a premium on it. A CDO 
rating ceiling would significantly impede this function. This 
should not cause us regret, however, as second-level securitiza-
tions that serve this purpose are likely to prove less-than-safe at 
precisely the moment they are most needed: during a crisis. 
The other market imperfection to which CDOs may re-
spond is market incompleteness. Our approach would do 
nothing directly to impede this response, as ratings are not 
necessary to any market-completing function CDOs may serve. 
On the other hand, it is possible that high ratings were neces-
sary for CDO issuance for other reasons, and that a byproduct 
of CDO creation was completing certain markets. If this is the 
case, it will be a loss, but one that is probably worth bearing in 
return for reduced systemic risk. 
Would the First Amendment impede a mandatory ceiling? 
First Amendment concerns may prevent the direct imposi-
tion of a rating ceiling on NRSROs, but it would be possible to 
achieve the same end by regulating the sale of CDOs.IIO For 
example, if the rule were that CDO ratings cannot exceed the 
weighted average of the collateral ratings, the SEC could for-
bid the sale of any structured finance CDO 111 that has received 
a rating for which the issuer has paid that exceeds this average. 
Unsolicited ratings for CDOs require information that is not 
110. See, e.g., Letter from Eugene Volokh, Professor, UCLA Sch. of Law, 
to Members of the House of Representatives Fin. Servo Comm. (May 15, 
2009), at 9, available at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financial 
svcs_dem/volokh .pdf (explaining that despite First Amendment obstacles 
to "direct regulation of agency evaluations ... , Congress could. . . require 
that various commercial transactions. . . be accompanied with reports that 
comply with certain guidelines"). 
1] 1. Defined as a securitization that includes, or, in the case of managed 
CDOs, can include in its collateral pool any structured product. 
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publicly available; as described below,1l2 the SEe now requires 
that such information be made available to other rating agen-
cies on a password-protected website. The SEe could further 
require that any rating agency availing itself of this informa-
tion agree not to assign a rating to a eno greater than the 
weighted average of its collateral. 
Could issuers replicate the effects of a CDO at the first level of 
securitization? 
One possible question is whether issuers and rating agen-
cies could reproduce the effect of the eno market through 
first-level securitizations. In theory they could, but doing so 
would likely have to rest on either (a) enormous collateral 
pools that would be very costly and difficult to assemble, or (b) 
parameter assumptions so cynically unrealistic that they would 
invite a harsh regulatory and market response. 
In considering this question, we should remind ourselves 
of what structured finance enos did: they pooled junior 
RMBS tranches, and against this pool they issued new securi-
ties, a very high percentage of which were AAA. The first level 
of securitization turned 80 percent of the dollar value of risky 
mortgages into AAA bonds. The second level took tranches 
from the bottom 20 percent, and turned 80-90 percent of 
these tranches into AAA bonds. Mter two rounds of securitiza-
tion, $100 million worth of subprime mortgages might support 
more than $97 million worth of AAA bonds,l13 With repeated 
rounds of securitization,114 the value of AAA bonds based on a 
pool of mortgages could asymptotically approach the face 
value of the underlying mortgages. Indeed, the value of the 
AAA bonds could exceed the value of the underlying mort-
gages, as enos were built in part from credit default swaps 
that referenced particular RMBS tranches. 115 
The eno process relied on assumptions about imperl'ect 
correlation in the credit perl'ormance of mezzanine tranches 
of a wide array of first-level securitizations. One could imagine 
112. See infra note 130 and accompanying text. 
113. See, e.g., Gorton, Subprime Panic, supra note 18, at 13 (showing tranche 
size by rating as a percentage of deal size in typical subprime RMBS and 
Mezz eno deals). 
114. See Barnett-Hart, supra note 9, at 29. 
115. See Credit Risk Transfer, supra note 2, at 5. 
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that instead of, say, 100 RMBS and one cno, one could con-
struct a single giant RMBS and, using the correlation assump-
tions that informed the cno, assign AAA ratings to a tranche 
or tranches making up, say, 97 percent instead of 81 percent 
of the entire deal structure. The problem with this is that the 
correlation assumptions about the mezzanine tranches, to the 
degree they were at all plausible, rely on types of risk diversifi-
cation that would be very hard to achieve with one securitiza-
tion, particularly diversification across vintages (e.g., RMBS 
tranches of different origination date). Diversification across 
underwriters would also be more difficult to achieve, though 
this might be partially offset if the deal were syndicated. With 
or without this diversification, the warehousing risk of building 
a first-level asset-backed security of this size would be ex-
tremely large. enos were typically built from more than 100 
securities,116 so the warehousing risk associated with building a 
giant first-level security to mimic the eno market would likely 
be roughly two orders of magnitude greater than the risk asso-
ciated with any single RMBS deal. In the sample of more than 
3,000 RMBS discussed above,117 the average deal size was $896 
million for subprime-backed RMBS, and $595 million for 
RMBS backed by Alt-A mortgages. I IS The warehousing risk for 
a monster RMBS, then, could be in the tens of billions of dol-
lars. This would make it a significantly more costly and less 
attractive venture, even to a consortium of underwriters. 
If, on the other hand, rating agencies relaxed their pa-
rameter assumptions and assigned AAA ratings to a much 
higher percentage of a typical RMBS deal, it would relatively 
clear that the agency had eschewed any aspirations toward 
quality, and much easier for the market and regulators to re-
spond in real time. First-level securitizations, while complex, 
are significantly more transparent than enos, and it would be 
much more difficult for the rating agencies to justifY assigning 
AAA ratings to, say, 97 percent of a subprime RMBS issuance. 
Again, part of the reason that AAA-rated eno tranches were 
attractive was that they hid risk. 
In any event, first-level securitizations have a clear eco-
nomic rationale; they will continue to be rated, and it is usually 
116. Barnett-Hart, supra note 9, at 106. 
117. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
118. Ashcraft et al., supra note 23, at thl. 1. 
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justifiable for a substantial portion of each such securitization 
to receive the highest rating. It is better to try to encourage 
quality ratings for these instruments in other ways. The ratio-
nale for eDOs is weaker, and their sensitivity to parameter as-
sumptions significantly greater. For eDOs, a hard and fast rule 
makes more sense. 
Is a rating ceiling needed given other reforms? 
A final key question is whether this reform is needed, 
given the many reforms affecting rating agencies in the Dodd-
Frank Act, earlier SEC rule changes, and other reform propos-
als put forward by critics. Below I explain why a rating cap for 
structured finance eDOs is a useful supplement to the other 
reforms, proposed or enacted. 
B. Other proposals 
A number of credit rating agency reforms have been en-
acted, and others proposed, since the onset of the crisis. These 
reforms address important flaws in the ratings process, some 
of which exacerbated overly optimistic ratings in structured fi-
nance, but none targets the specific problem of eDOs. Here I 
briefly discuss credit rating reform efforts categorized by the 
perceived problems they attempt to address. 
1. Conflict of interest 
The majority of proposals and reform efforts have focused 
on the conflict of interest inherent in the rating agencies' busi-
ness model: the agencies are paid by the firms whose bonds 
they rate.n9 Issuers want to see higher ratings for their bonds 
as it lowers their cost of capital,120 and may exert pressure on 
rating agencies to inflate their ratings. Credit rating agencies' 
reputational concerns should, theoretically, steel them against 
such pressure, but the drive to expand market share and to 
119. See, e.g., SUMMARY REpORT OF ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN TIlE COMMISSION 
STAFF'S EXAMINATION OF SELECT CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 23 (July 2008), 
http://www.sec.gov / news/ studies/2008/ craexamination070808. pdf. 
120. It may do so in two ways. First, buyers may believe the rating, perceive 
lower credit risk, and pay more for the bonds. Second, regardless of whether 
they believe the rating or not, higher ratings may, at certain trip points, ex-
pand the market to institutions that face rating-based holding and capital 
requirements. 
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generate short-term profits may trump longer-term reputa-
tional concerns. 121 
There are two principal types of reform that aim to ad-
dress this conflict of interest. First, some reforms try to 
counteract the effects of the conflict by increasing the cost of 
inaccuracy, particularly through increasing rating agencies' ex-
posure to liability.122 Second, some proposed reforms would 
eliminate the conflict by changing the rating agency business 
model.I23 While addressing the rating agencies' conflict of in-
terest is important, and some of these reforms may be worth 
implementing, they are insufficient as a response to the COO 
problem this paper has outlined. Our concern is to prevent 
the explosion of COOs during the next asset bubble; decades 
of steady performance in a given ABS class could reduce wari-
ness about a shock or a "worst-case" scenario, and goodfaith 
(rather than venal) assumptions that prove slightly off about 
default probabilities and correlations could again have disas-
trous consequences for senior bonds at the second level of 
securitization. Addressing the conflict of interest will not pre-
vent this, but a limit on COO ratings could. 
2. Regulatory licensing 
Perhaps the most profound reform enacted by Oodd-
Frank is the immediate removal of references to rating agen-
cies from a number of federal laws, and its prescription that 
federal agencies remove regulatory references to ratings 
within 12 months. 124 This jibes with a view held by some critics 
that rating agencies' primary function is to provide regulatory 
121. See FONS, supra note lOB, at 2 ("It is argued that building a stellar 
reputation requires a long-tenn horizon and view. Yet managers of publicly 
owned rating agencies are subject to intense short-tenn pressure to demon-
strate earnings growth. It takes tremendous discipline to turn away business, 
particularly when competitors are building market share."). 
122. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 7Bu-4 (West 2006); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Re-
fonn and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 933(b) (2010) 
(lowering the scienter element of the pleading standard against rating agen-
cies in private securities fraud cases). 
123. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Refonn and Consumer Protection 
Act § 939F (2010). This provision directs the SEC to study the feasibility of 
setting up a clearinghouse that would receive payments from issuers, and 
channel assignments and payments randomly to pre-selected ratings agen-
cies. 
124. [d. § 939A. 
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licenses, not to seIVe as reputational intermediaries.125 Be-
cause ratings have been used so heavily in regulation to pre-
scribe what investors may hold, issuers have had to hire the 
rating agencies in order to sell their debt, regardless of the 
informational content of ratings. If this view is correct, reforms 
that assume the continued use of ratings in regulation are a 
waste of time. Stripping references to the rating agencies from 
laws and regulations is necessary to force rating agencies to 
function legitimately as reputational intermediaries or to die. 
If investors do not trust rating agencies, and have no regula-
tions to try to game, they will not pay a premium for bonds 
rated by the agencies, and issuers will see no reason to hire 
them in the first place. This, in tum, will make rating agencies 
guard their reputations much more jealously. 
While Dodd-Frank gready reduces regulatory reliance on 
ratings, issuers and investors will likely continue to have incen-
tives to push for or wink at inflated ratings, for several reasons. 
First, many state regulators will continue to rely on ratings. 
Second, even if, for example, money market mutual funds no 
longer have to refer to ratings to determine their holding re-
quirements, the boards of these funds will likely continue to 
refer to them voluntarily, if for no other reason than to mini-
mize their own risk of liability. Finally, ratings remain a key 
factor in private contractual arrangements to control risk-tak-
ing by fund managers and to manage counterparty risk. 
More generally, removing references to ratings may ad-
dress problems with the rating process arising out of compla-
cency, but again, it will not prevent minor estimation errors, 
made in good faith, that the CDO structure amplifies. This is 
where a rating ceiling can fill the gap. 
3. Lack of competition 
Some critics believe the Big Three credit rating agencies 
have been sheltered from concerns about reputation because 
they constitute an oligopoly, with significant entry barriers. 
Views have differed on how much this oligopoly was due to 
regulation, and how much to "natural" economic forces, as it 
was extraordinarily difficult to attain NRSRO status prior to 
125. See Partnoy, supra note 45, at 681-686. 
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the Credit Rating Agency Refonn Act of 2006.126 At least in the 
field of structured finance, the recent success of Dominion 
Bond Rating Services (DBRS) , which attained NRSRO status in 
2007,127 has cast doubt on the idea of a natural oligopoly. 
DBRS's market share of the mortgage-backed security market, 
non-existent prior to the crisis, climbed to 18 percent in 2008, 
and 41 percent in 2009.128 Moody's share, meanwhile fell from 
40 percent in 2008 to 6 percent in 2009. 129 
Those who nonetheless believe features of oligopoly per-
sist often call for increased competition in the rating industry. 
The problem with this, particularly for CDOs, is that increased 
competition could lead to a "race to the bottom" rather than 
the top, as rating agencies compete for business by offering 
higher ratings to larger CDO tranches than other agencies. 130 
Particularly in a bubble, when vigilance is low and fund man-
agers are less circumspect about trying to goose returns, the 
existence of more rating agencies would likely provide struc-
tured finance issuers with more chances to increase AAA 
tranche sizes, exacerbating the problem with CDO ratings. 
This, in turn, raises questions about the practice of rating 
shopping. 
126. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.l7g-1 (2007) (streamlining the registration pro-
cess for NRSROs). 
127. Order Granting Registration ofDBRS Limited as a Nationally Recog-
nized Statistical Rating Organization, Exchange Act Release No. 34-56508, 
2007 SEC LEXIS 2187 (Sept. 24, 2007). 
128. Aaron Lucchetti & Serena Ng, Still Broken: "Ratings Sh&pping" Lives on 
as Congress Debates a Fix, WALL ST. j., May 24, 2010, at AI. 
129. Id. 
130. A race to the top would mean that competition improved ratings 
quality; a race to the bottom would mean competition would hann ratings 
quality. Both outcomes are plausible. A study of the impact of Fitch breaking 
into corporate bond rating market in 1990s has shown that average rating 
quality declined. Bo Becker & Todd Milbourn, Reputation and Competition: 
Evidence from the Credit Rating Industry (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 
09-051, 2009), available at http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/09-051.pdf. 
But see Neil A. Doherty et aI., Does Competition Improve Ratings? (Sept. 14, 
2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.pfp.gsu.edu/ 
Research/downloads/Phillips_RA_insurance.pdf (showing that when S&P 
broke into the previously niche insurance rating market, challenging mo-
nopolist rater AM Best, average rating quality improved). 
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4. Rating shopping 
An issuer may "shop" for a rating by determining what rat-
ing an agency would assign to a particular debt issuance - ei-
ther by paying the agency for a preliminary opinion or run-
ning numbers through a publicly available rating agency 
model - and paying for publication of only the highest rating 
or ratings. Rating shopping constitutes a principal vehicle of 
the race-to-the-bottom scenario, and is key to explaining why 
the issuer-pays conflict of interest might have pernicious ef-
fects with respect to RMBS and CDOs. It deserves to be treated 
separately from the conflict of interest issue, however, because 
even absent conscious decisions or bad modeling by the rating 
agencies, rating shopping might lead to inflated ratings. To 
the degree that greater complexity leads to greater variance in 
the evaluation of credit risk, and as long as there is not a sys-
tematic conservative bias in the varied evaluations, choosing 
the highest rating will lead to systematically inflated ratings. lsl 
Rating shopping likely led to larger AAA tranches for 
CDOs than would otherwise have been the case.132 The SEC 
recently attempted to address rating shopping by facilitating 
unsolicited ratings of structured financial products, so that 
firms that have been passed over for a rating can still express 
their views on an offering. I3S If rating shopping can be success-
fully prevented, it would dampen bad-faith or venal ratings ac-
tions by the agencies, but it would be unlikely to kill them off 
entirely, especially in the "repeat game" that structured fi-
nance has become.134 Nor would the prevention of rating 
shopping affect good faith ratings during bubbles that inno-
cently ignore the tail risk of a product like the CDO. Again, a 
CDO ceiling would provide a valuable supplemental safeguard 
131. VasiIiki Skreta & Laura Veldkamp, Ratings Shopping and Asset Complex-
ity: A Theory of &tings Inflation (N.Y. Univ. Stern Sch. Of Bus., Working Pa-
per, 2008), availahle at http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/papers.cfm?abstracc 
id=1295503 (describing a dynamic similar to that of the "winner's curse" in 
auction theory, where imperfect information leads to a dispersion of bid 
levels around the actual value of the item up for sale, so that the winner 
always bids too much); see also Richard Thaler, Anomalies: The Winner's Curse, 
2 J. ECON. PERSPS. 191 (1988). 
132. See Griffin & Tang, supra note 13, at 20. 
133. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-5 (2007). 
134. In other words, rating agencies could bend at the threat oflosing not 
the current deal, but future deals. 
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to help prevent hidden risk from building during the next 
market euphoria. 
CONCLUSION 
While conflicts of interest, regulatory arbitrage, lack of 
competition, and rating shopping may have helped drive in-
flated CDO ratings, this was not the fundamental problem 
with CDOs. The fundamental problem with structured finance 
CDOs is their sensitivity to baseline parameter assumptions, 
and their "all-or-nothing" character - paying off with a 
probability approaching 1 in normal times, while losing a huge 
portion of their value in a systemic crisis. 
Placing a ceiling on the ratings a structured finance CDO 
can receive would impede its use as a way to hide tail risk, or to 
exploit poor quality or outdated ratings of first-level securitiza-
tions. A rating ceiling is probably better than an outright ban, 
as it allows the use of CDOs to the degree that they serve a 
legitimate purpose, while limiting their pernicious effects. Im-
posing a ceiling on structured finance CDO ratings is not a 
silver bullet, but it could prove an effective way to limit risk 
and to help avoid systemic crises in the future. 
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